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The Defendant Joinder Problem
in Title VII Civil Actions
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 established an elabo-
rate scheme to enforce its prohibition of discrimination in em-
ployment practices on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. An individual aggrieved by an alleged unlawful
employment practice must file a charge with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, which investigates the charge and
attempts to secure voluntary compliance with the Act. If the EEOC
administrative process fails to produce a satisfactory settlement, the
aggrieved person may initiate a civil action to remedy the violation
in federal district court.
The language of Title VII, however, significantly limits the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts by providing
that civil actions can only be maintained against alleged dis-
criminators named in a charge filed with the EEOC.2 Thus, for
example, the Title VII complainant who files a charge with the
EEOC without the aid of an attorney3 may subsequently discover
that his judicial relief in a Title VII civil action is limited because he
failed to name all appropriate parties as respondents before the
EEOC.4
This comment will argue that such a limitation on subject matter
jurisdiction is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of Title
VII-to provide effective relief against unlawful employment
practices. 5 It begins with an analysis of the Title VII enforcement
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. II, 1972) [hereinafter referred to in text as Title VII].
2. See text and notes at notes 23-24 infra.
3. Of course, even an attorney may not be certain at the EEOC stage of the enforcement
process whether a given party will subsequently be considered a necessary or indispensable
party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19; text and
notes at notes 23-33 infra.
4. See, e.g., Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967).
5. The Supreme Court has emphasized that creation of procedural technicalities is "in-
appropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the
process." Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972). See Comment, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964: Obtaining Jurisdiction Over Respondents Who Were Not Named as Respondents
in a Charge to the EEOC, 75 DICK. L. REV. 99, 106-08 (1970).
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procedure and the general obstacles to bringing suit against parties
not named as respondents before the EEOC. The comment then
critically examines the approaches used by several lower federal
courts to circumvent the explicit statutory restriction on their sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in Title VII actions. The comment con-
cludes by proposing several amendments to the statute that would
permit defendants not named before the EEOC to be joined with-
out significant interference with other interests that the statute was
designed to protect.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DEFENDANT JOINDER IN
TITLE VII PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
A. Statutory Framework
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribed certain dis-
criminatory employment practices6 and established the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission,7 which was to "endeavor to
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by in-
formal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. '8 This
informal conciliation process is triggered when either a person
claiming to be aggrieved by alleged unlawful employment practices
or a member of the Commission files a written charge with the
Commission. 9 If the charge is timely-filed within 180 days after
the alleged discrimination occurred 0-the Commission is required
to notify the alleged discriminator of the charge and then to de-
termine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is valid."
If the Commission reaches a finding of reasonable cause, it en-
courages the complainant and the respondents named in the
charge to enter the conciliation process in order to obtain a volun-
tary settlement of all issues without an action in the district court.' 2
The primary emphasis of this administrative process is on vindica-
tion of equal employment opportunity rights through informal and
voluntary conciliation; the Commission has the power neither to
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-3 (Supp. II, 1972).
7. Id. § 2000e-4.
8. Id. § 2000e-5(b). This process will be referred to throughout this comment as the
conciliation process.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 2000e-5(e). The 180 day period is extended for aggrieved persons who file
charges with qualified state or local enforcement agencies. Id.
11. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
12. See King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 947 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
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compel participation in the conciliation process nor to order com-
pliance with the Act. Participation in the informal proceedings is
encouraged by a requirement of confidentiality, in that nothing
said or done during the process can be made public or used in
subsequent proceedings without the consent of the persons
concerned. 13 The courts have interpreted this administrative en-
forcement procedure as having a dual purpose: to provide the
charged party with advance notice of the charge and to promote
voluntary compliance and conciliation. 14
Nevertheless, Title VII does authorize the Commission to bring
a civil action in federal district court if it is unable to achieve com-
pliance through conciliation. 15 And in the event that the Commis-
sion dismisses the charge, or has neither filed a civil action nor
successfully conciliated the dispute within 180 days after the filing
of written charges, the Act authorizes civil actions by either the
persons who filed the charge or, if the charges were filed by a
member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge al-
leges to have been aggrieved by an unlawful employment prac-
tice.' 6 If such a civil action is filed, the trial court proceedings con-
stitute a de novo adjudication of all issues of law and fact; the court
does not review the Commission proceedings or substitute its judg-
ment for that of the Commission. 17
This statutory framework is thus designed to protect several
competing interests. First, it is intended to assure timely and effec-
tive enforcement of Title VII rights; the statute establishes time
limits for each step in the enforcement process'8 and provides for
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
14. Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972). If one of the respondents is a govern-
ment, government agency, or political subdivision, the Attorney General rather than the
EEOC is authorized to sue. Id.
16. Id. The term aggrieved person will be used throughout this comment to refer both to
persons filing charges before the EEOC and to persons who are covered by a charge filed by
a member of the Commission.
17. Thus, even if the Commission concludes that there is not reasonable cause to believe
that the charge is valid, the aggrieved person can file a civil action. See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1972).
18. The Commission must make its reasonable cause determination "as promptly as
possible" and generally within 120 days after the filing of a charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(Supp. II, 1972). If the Commission is unable to secure voluntary compliance within 30 days
after a charge is filed, it may initiate a civil action in federal district court. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
If the Commission dismisses the charge, or fails to secure compliance or initiate a civil action
within 180 days after a charge is filed, an aggrieved person can initiate a civil action in
federal district court within 90 days after the EEOC notifies the person that he has authority
to sue. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The statute also requires that Title VII civil actions be 'im-
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judicial enforcement where necessary. 19 Second, it provides poten-
tial defendants with advance notice20 of charges of alleged unlaw-
ful practices and with a structured informal process for negotiating
with the complainant before a civil action is filed.2 1 Finally, it estab-
lishes an active role for the EEOC both in conciliating Title VII
disputes-and thus reducing the possibility that Title VII cases will
add to the already crowded federal district court dockets-and in
initiating and participating in litigation in the federal courts to
assure enforcement of Title VII rights.22
B. The Problem of Proper Defendants
Section 706(f)(1) of the Act2 3 authorizes the Commission and
aggrieved persons to file a civil action against the "respondent
named in the charge" that had been filed with the Commission.
The statute thus requires a complainant to proceed through the
EEOC before filing a civil action in federal district court, and has
been interpreted to preclude civil actions against parties not named
as respondents before the EEOC. 24
The problem of proceeding against a party not named before
the EEOC arises in a variety of Title VII claims. A person ag-
grieved by an unlawful employment practice might file a charge
mediately" assigned to a trial judge, who is instructed to "assign the case for hearing at the
earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited." Id. §
2000e-5(f)(4) to (5).
19. In addition to its provisions authorizing suit by the EEOC and private claimants, see
note 18 supra, the statute authorizes the EEOC to request "temporary or preliminary relief"
pending disposition of the charge before it. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (Supp. II, 1972).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
21. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). See Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 183 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)-(2) (Supp. ii, 1972). The Commission is also authorized
to intervene in a Title VII civil action initiated by an aggrieved party. Id. § 2000e-(4)(g)(6).
23. If... the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action
against any respondent ... named in the charge .... If a charge filed with the Commission
... is dismissed by the Commission, or if... the Commission has not filed a civil action
under this section ... or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement
to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission .. . shall so notify the person
aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be
brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be
aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any
person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment
practice....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(i) (Supp. II, 1972) (emphasis added). Prior to 1972, the EEOC did
not have the authority to initiate a civil action in federal district court; this authority was
added by the 1972 amendments to the Act. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 88 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
24. See authorities cited note 46 infra.
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before the EEOC against an employment service, for example, and
decide in the course of the subsequent civil action that it is neces-
sary to join the potential employer in order to obtain complete and
effective relief.25 The problem might also arise when an employee
files a charge against his employer and later discovers that effective
relief can only be obtained if his local union and its international
union are joined as party defendants. 26 It may even be a named
defendant that raises the issue of joining additional parties. 27 In
each situation, the problem generally results from the plaintiffs
having had insufficient information; the layman filing a charge
with the EEOC is unlikely to know in advance what parties may be
necessary or indispensable for obtaining subsequent effective judi-
cial relief.28 Moreover, the EEOC staff may itself be unable to
make that determination at the investigation and conciliation
stage. 9
The question of jurisdiction over defendants not charged before
the EEOC has serious implications for effective enforcement of
Title VII rights. If the district court determines that the potential
defendant is necessary for just adjudication of the dispute under
Rule 19(a)30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but concludes
25. See Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967) (employer named in initial civil complaint).
26. See Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (motion to join
international union under FED. R. Civ. P. 19).
27. See, e.g., Torockio v. Chamberlain Mfg. Co., 51 F.R.D. 517 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
28. A complainant may,'of course, exclude a party at the EEOC stage intentionally,
because of a fear of retaliation or a belief that attempts at conciliation would be more
successful in the party's absence.
29. The question of whether a party is necessary or indispensable for just adjudication
under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, is essentially a question
of law for the court. On the basis of the limited information before it, the Commission
obviously cannot predict whether a court would eventually conclude that an obscure party is
needed for just adjudication. See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 183 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
30. Rule 19(a) provides:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the
court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall
order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he
may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined
party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper,
he shall be dismissed from the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
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that failure to name the potential defendant before the EEOC is a
jurisdictional bar to joinder, the civil action must proceed without
the potential defendant.3 In that case, if the plaintiff has become
unable to charge the potential defendant before the EEOC because
the time period for filing a charge has expired, he may be left with
an ineffective remedy. Even more importantly, if the district court
determines that the potential defendant is an indispensable party
under Rule 19(b)32 and that there is a jurisdictional bar to joinder,
the civil action must be dismissed.33
C. Legislative History
The legislative history of Title VII's enforcement procedure
provides few clues as to Congress's intent concerning the de-
fendant joinder issue. 34 The original bill that passed in the House
of Representatives, 35 authorized the EEOC, if conciliation failed, to
31. A somewhat analogous problem arises in cases that are in federal court on the basis
of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). The established interpretation of
section 1332 is that there must be complete diversity of citizenship between plaintiffs and
defendants. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). A necessary nondiverse
party may not be joined if doing so would destroy complete diversity, see, e.g., Dunham v.
Robertson, 198 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1952), and such a party may be dismissed from an action
to preserve diversity jurisdiction over the other parties. See, e.g., Jett v. Phillips & Associates,
439 F.2d 987, 989-90 (10th Cir. 1971). In a Title VII case, on the other hand, failure to
charge a party before the EEOC precludes asserting subject matter jurisdiction over that
party but does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the action itself. Cf. Sabolsky v.
Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972) (dismissal of only those
defendants over whom subject matter jurisdiction could not be asserted under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act).
32. Rule 19(b) provides:
If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to
what extent ajudgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or
those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judg-
ment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate;
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
33. Id. The diversity analogy applies here also. A civil action based on diversity jurisdic-
tion must be dismissed if there is a nondiverse indispensable party. See, e.g., Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 429 F.2d 77, 79-80 (5th Cir. 1970).
34. "The stormy legislative history of Title VII renders the intent of Congress in its
administration far from clear." Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 183 (D.C. Cir.
1974). See generally EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1968).
35. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (House version). See 110 CoNG. REc. 2804-05
(1964); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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bring a civil action to "prevent the respondent" from engaging in
unlawful employment practices. 36 The aggrieved person was au-
thorized to initiate a civil action if the EEOC failed or declined to
bring its own action.37 Instead of being referred to a Senate com-
mittee, the House bill went directly to the floor of the Senate
where, faced with a filibuster, supporters of the House bill and the
Senate leadership worked out a compromise bill. The compromise
bill eliminated the EEOC's authority to institute civil actions when
conciliation failed but retained a provision authorizing an ag-
grieved person to file a civil action against the "respondent named
in the charge" before the EEOC.38 Cloture was invoked shortly
thereafter and the compromise version passed the Senate. The
version of the bill that passed in the Senate was sent directly to the
House rather than to a joint conference committee, and it was
passed without amendment.39
The legislative history of Title VII's enforcement procedure thus
fails to clarify congressional intent concerning the defendant join-
der problem. There is neither a Senate committee report nor a
conference committee report, and the House report analyzes a bill
containing enforcement language that differs substantially from
the version that eventually was enacted. 40 Finally, the defendant
joinder problem was not even considered in the course of the floor
debates. 41
Title VII was amended in 1972 to authorize the EEOC, as well as
aggrieved parties, to initiate a civil action in federal court against
respondents named in charges before the Commission. 42 The legis-
lative history of this 1972 amendment also fails to indicate congres-
sional intent concerning the defendant joinder problem. 43
36. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707(b) (1963) (House version).
37. The aggrieved person had to obtain the permission of at least one member of the
Commission before initiating suit. Id. § 707(c) (1963).
38. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 706(e) (1963) (Mansfield-Dirksen substitute,
Amendment 656).
39. 110 CoNG. Rec. 15897 (1964).
40. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 431,452-54 (1966).
41. Oddly enough, Senator Humphrey, the floor manager of the bill in the Senate, was
not even aware that the proposed bill required a complainant to resort to the EEOC before
initiating a civil action in federal district court. In an exchange with Senator Cannon, he
expressed the opinion that a complainant could completely bypass the EEOC. 110 CONG.
REC. 14188 (1964). The federal courts, however, have uniformly interpreted Title VII as
requiring a complainant to exhaust his remedies before the EEOC. See, e.g., Stebbins v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 910 (1968).
42. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 88 Stat. 103,
amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
43. See SUBCONIi. ON LABOR, SENATE CoNiM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG.,
1975)
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II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION OF TITLE VII CLAIMS
AGAINST NONRESPONDENT DEFENDANTS
Section 706(f)(3) of the Act 44 grants 'jurisdiction of actions
brought under this subchapter" to the federal district courts, in-
cluding civil actions filed under section 706(f)(1) 45 against parties
charged before the EEOC (respondent defendants). A number of
lower federal courts have narrowly construed this grant of jurisdic-
tion and have either dismissed from the district court action or
refused to allow joinder of nonrespondent defendants-defen-
dants who had not been named as respondents before the EEOC. 46
In Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service,47 for example,
the complainant attempted to name both a state employment
service and a potential employer in his complaint in federal dis-
trict court after having named only the state employment service
in the charge filed with the EEOC. The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the potential
employer on the ground that it had not been charged before the
EEOC.48
At the outset, it is important to distinguish cases like
Mickel-involving joinder of parties who could have been charged
before the EEOC-from cases in which the parties sought to be
joined are not employers, 49 employment agencies, 50 or labor
organizations,5' which are the only parties subject to Title VII's
prohibitions. Joinder in the district court proceeding of necessary
and indispensable parties who could not have been joined before
the EEOC can be supported on a theory of ancillary jurisdiction.5 2
2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AcT OF 1972
(Comm. Print 1972).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Supp. II, 1972).
45. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
46. Williams v. General Foods, 492 F.2d 399, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1974); LeBeau v. Libby-
Owens-Ford, 484 F.2d 798, 799 (7th Cir. 1973); Marlowe v. Fisher-Body, 6 EPD Cases
8997, at 6236 (6th Cir. 1973); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir.
1969); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1969); Mickel v. South
Carolina State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877
(1967); Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454, 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1971); Butler v.
Laborers' Locals 4 & 269, 308 F. Supp. 528, 531 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Cox v. United States
Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74, 76 (N.D. Ind. 1968); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F.
Supp. 27, 29 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
47. 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 877 (1967).
48. Id. at 242.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
50. Id. § 2000e(c).
51. Id. § 2000e(d).
52. For example, in Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 57 F.R.D. 102, 105
(N.D. Miss. 1972), the court ordered joinder of the Secretary of Labor under Rule 19(a)
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Joinder of such parties would not contravene the limits on subject
matter jurisdiction explicitly mentioned in Title VII. On the other
hand, joinder of parties who could have been joined before the
EEOC would directly violate the restriction that Congress placed
on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus, al-
though ancillary jurisdiction may justify the joinder of nonrespon-
dent defendants in some cases, it cannot justify joinder of defen-
dants against whom independent Title VII claims would lie.
In cases involving nonrespondent defendants against whom a
Title VII charge could have been brought, the refusal to allow
their joinder can seriously impair the ability of a district court to
remedy the alleged unlawful employment practice.53 Indeed, if the
district court concludes that a nonrespondent defendant is an in-
dispensable party within the meaning of Rule 19(b), 54 the entire
action must be dismissed.55 Since this latter possibility may involve
complete denial of judicial relief if the complainant is precluded by
section 706(e)'s 180 day rule5 6 from naming the nonrespondent
defendant in a new charge before the EEOC, most federal courts
have concluded that nonrespondent defendants are dispensable
parties.5 7 Several federal courts have gone even further and, in an
attempt to assure complete and effective relief for Title VII plain-
tiffs with valid claims, have utilized a variety of other theories to
maintain that failure to charge a party before the EEOC is not a
bar to proceeding against that party in a civil action.
because the relief sought would have violated regulations promulgated by the Secretary and
would have subjected the defendant employment service to multiple or inconsistent obliga-
tions in the absence of the Secretary. The Secretary of Labor could not have been charged
before the EEOC on the facts of the case. See Bremer v. St. Louis S.W.R.R., 310 F. Supp.
1333, 1340 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (joinder of party who had received a contested job). But see
Reyes v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 53 F.R.D. 293 (D. Kan. 1971) (joinder of a local union
that could have been charged before the EEOC allowed under Rule 19, relying on Bremer).
See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 9 (2d ed. 1970).
53. See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). See note 32 supra.
55. See, e.g., EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 245 (N.D.
Ala. 1974): Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l Harvester Co., 301 F. Supp. 663, 667
(N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911
(1970).
56. "A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II,
1972).
57. See, e.g., LeBeau v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 484 F.2d 798, 801-02 (7th Cir. 1973);
Butler v. Laborers' Locals 4 & 269, 308 F. Supp. 528, 532 (N.D. Ill. 1969). See also 3A J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 19.07-2[4], at 2262 n.3 (2d ed. 1974).
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A. The Agency Relationship Theory
Several courts have suggested in dicta,58 and at least one court
has held,59 that a Title VII plaintiff may proceed against a party
not charged before the EEOC if an agent of that nonrespondent
defendant had been named in the initial EEOC charge. For exam-
ple, this agency theory could justify joinder of an international
union that had not been named in the charge filed with the EEOC
if a member local union had actually been charged. Courts discus-
sing this agency theory have emphasized, however, that more than
"mere affiliation" is required to establish a relationship sufficient to
justify joinder.60 Specifically, the relationship between the two par-
ties must be close enough to warrant treating one party as the
agent of the other party for the purpose of conciliation. 6'
This approach enables the court to conclude that a nonrespon-
dent defendant, through its relationship with a respondent defen-
dant, has notice of the charges filed with the EEOC. Since the
nonrespondent defendant would have had an opportunity to
remedy the alleged unlawful employment practice and to engage
in discussions with the complainant, his interests would be pro-
tected even if joinder were permitted in the district court proceed-
ing. And the interests of the complainant and respondent defen-
dants would certainly not be adversely affected by allowing joinder
of the "principal" nonrespondent defendant. The agency relation-
ship theory therefore appears to violate neither the letter nor the
spirit of Title VII.
Nevertheless, the agency relationship theory is of limited practi-
cal value because it requires so significant a relationship between
the nonrespondent defendant and the respondent defendant.
When, as in most cases, the relationship is nonexistent or weak
-for example, "mere affiliation"-it is unreasonable to treat the
58. Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.)
(dictum), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967); Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp. 775, 782
(D. Minn. 1968) (dictum); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D.N.C.
1968) (dictum).
59. Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 373 F. Supp. 885, 911 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
60. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D.N.C. 1967). See also .Mickel
v. South Carolina State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
877 (1967); Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp. 755, 782 (D. Minn. 1968).
61. In one federal district, the courts have rejected the agency theory but have allowed a
nonrespondent to be joined where there was "substantial identity" between that party and a
party charged before the EEOC. McDonald v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 308 F. Supp.
664, 669 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (substantial identity); Butler v. Laborers' Locals 4 & 269, 308 F.
Supp. 528, 531 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (rejecting agency theory). Accord, Chastang v. Flynn &
Emrich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957, 964 (D. Md. 1973).
[42:315
Defendant Joinder in Title VII Actions
nonrespondent defendant as having had effective notice and an
opportunity to negotiate over or remedy the alleged unlawful em-
ployment practice, and joinder is thus not justified.
B. The Parallel Civil Rights Action Theory62
A number of federal courts63 have recently permitted Title VII
plaintiffs to proceed against nonrespondent defendants by estab-
lishing a civil rights cause of action under section 1981 of title 42 of
the United States Code,6 4 which provides that "[a]ll persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right.., to
make and enforce contracts, . ..as is enjoyed by white citizens
... ." Such a cause of action would have been rejected under early
judicial constructions of section 1981 that read a state action re-
quirement into the statute.6 5 But the Supreme Court decision in
1968 in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,66 has enabled federal courts to
apply section 1981 to private discrimination 67 in the contractual
relationships between an employee and his employer and between
an employee and his union.6 8 In Jones, the Court held that section
1982 of title 42,69 which guarantees all citizens of the United States
the same property rights as those enjoyed by white citizens, applied
to "all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or
rental of property. '70 The lower federal courts have extended this
private discrimination interpretation to section 1981, since both
sections 1981 and 1982 are derived from section 1 of the Civil
62. For a discussion of the relationship between 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1970) and Title VII, see
Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHi. L.
REv. 615 (1969).
63. Payne v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.2d 1107, 1107-08 (8th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v. Na-
tional Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1971); Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757,
758-60 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476,
481-85 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). Cf. Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d
621, 623 (8th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1379
(4th Cir. 1972); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1016
(5th Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
65. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodges, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313,
317-18 (1879).
66. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
67. See cases cited note 63 supra.
68. These relationships are undoubtedly contractual. See Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys-
tems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l
Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 1970): Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212,
292 F. Stipp. 413, 442 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
70. 392 U.S. at 413 (emphasis in original).
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Rights Act of 1866.71 Moreover, it has been held that the passage
of Title VII neither limited nor impliedly repealed the applicability
of section 1981 to employment contracts.7 2
This civil rights action theory, like the agency relationship
theory, can be used to circumvent the procedural tangle of the
nonrespondent defendant problem in only limited circumstances.
First, section 1981 applies only to discrimination based on race.73
Since over one-third of all EEOC charges involve allegations of
discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin,7 4 the civil
rights action theory fails to authorize joinder in a significant
number of cases-an asymmetry in result that is a function of the
interpretation of section 1981 rather than a legislative policy de-
cision in Title VII itself. Second, section 1981 is inapplicable to
certain types of unlawful employment practices, 7 5 such as dis-
charge of an employee for filing charges with the EEOC.7 6
C. Stay of Judicial Proceedings
A third approach to the nonrespondent defendant joinder prob-
lem is to grant a stay of the district court proceedings for up to
sixty days under section 706(f)(1) of the Act,77 for the purpose of
allowing the plaintiff to return to the EEOC to name the nonre-
spondent defendant as a respondent. This approach has the ad-
71. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
72. Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 623-24 (8th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v.
National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1971); Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757,
760-63 (3d Cir. 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011,
1016 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l Harvester Co., 427
F.2d 476, 484-89 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). It has also been held that
exhaustion of Title VII remedies is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to section 1981 actions.
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 1974);
Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1974).
73. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968); Willingham v. Macon
Tel. Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535, 537 n.1 (5th Cir. 1973); Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 373 F.
Supp. 996, 998 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Abshire v. Chicago & E.I. R.R., 352 F. Supp. 601, 605
(N.D. Ill. 1972).
74. 7 EEOC ANN. REP. 38 (1972).
75. See Tramble v. Converters Ink Co., 343 F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (Supp. II, 1972).
77. Section 706(f)(1) provides:
Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more
than sixty days pending termination of State or local proceedings described in subsec-
tion (c) or (d) of this section or further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary
compliance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
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vantage of circumventing the nonrespondent defendant problem
without denying that defendant an actual opportunity to utilize the
EEOC conciliation process.
There are, however, three major difficulties with this approach.
First, the EEOC's heavy case load may prevent it from reconsider-
ing a charge as it relates to the new party within the 60 day stay
of the district court proceedings. The Commission is already un-
able to provide conciliation in all cases in which it makes reasonable
cause findings7 8 and sometimes is unable to make a reasonable
cause determination within the 120 day period required by
statute.7 9 It is thus likely, that remand to the Commission will ac-
complish only the addition of a new party to the charge, and not
the provision of an opportunity for conciliation. Of course, remand
to the EEOC does provide an initial nonrespondent defendant with
actual advance notice of the charge and an opportunity to
negotiate independently with the complainant.80
A second and more serious difficulty with this approach is
caused by the statutory requirement that a charge must be filed
with the EEOC "within one hundred and eighty days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred .... 8 If more
than one hundred and eighty days have elapsed between the date
of the alleged violation and the date of the remand to the EEOC,
the Commission will not have jurisdiction over a charge naming the
new party.82 If the alleged violation is a continuing one, of course,
the one hundred and eighty day period may never expire-each
day of a continuing alleged unlawful practice constitutes a new
violation of the statute. 83 The courts have been unwilling to ex-
78. 7 EEOC ANN. REP. 51-53 (1972).
79. Id.
80. It should be noted as well that joinder of a nonrespondent defendant in the district
court proceeding provides somewhat similar notice and opportunity.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
82. Nor can the charge against the new party be considered an amendment to the
original claim that relates back to the time the initial charge was filed. EEOC regulations
authorize amendments only when they cure technical defects in the charge or clarify and
amplify the initial allegations, and an amendment may relate back only if it is directly related
to or grows out of the subject matter of the original charge. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 1(b) (1974);
cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (allowing relation back of amendments to pleadings charging parties
only in limited cases of mistaken identity).
83. Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 414 F.2d 73, 84-85 (8th Cir. 1969) (discriminatory job
classification); Mixson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 334 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (denial of pension benefits); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891, 895-96
(D. Me. 1970) (refusal to process grievance).
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pand this continuing violation concept, however, simply to circum-
vent the nonrespondent defendant problem.14
The third difficulty with a stay of judicial proceedings to solve
the nonrespondent defendant problem is that it is discretionary. If
the trial judge refuses to grant a stay, the plaintiff will be unable to
join the nonrespondent defendant unless he can show on appeal
that the refusal was an abuse of discretion.8 5
D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Theory
At least two federal district courts8 6 have completely excused
complainants from the statutory requirement that they file charges
with the EEOC before initiating civil actions in federal district
court, on the ground that the particular facts of the cases rendered
resort to the EEOC futile.8 7 In Washington v. Baugh Construction
Co.,88 the court considered alleged discriminatory practices that
had existed for some time in the construction trades in the state of
Washington and that had previously been considered by the EEOC
under formal charges in a different case. 89 The court reasoned
that although resort to the EEOC for conciliation is generally a
prerequisite to a civil action under Title VII, the procedures
"would appear frivolous when all previous attempts to achieve such
compliance, including informal but serious attempts by the
[EEOC], have failed to resolve any of the major issues." 90 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the Title
VII claim even though the complainants had bypassed the EEOC
procedure completely. 91
84. Phillips v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 533, 537-38 (S.D.W. Va. 1972), aff'd, 474
F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1973) (termination of employment); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe &
Foundry Co., 310 F. Supp. 195, 197 (W.D. Va. 1969) (transfer); Cox v. United States
Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74, 79 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (layoff).
85. Cf. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Co. v. Kent, 309 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 982 (1963); Duisberg v. Markham, 149 F.2d 812 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 759
(1945); Girard Trust Co. v. Amsterdam, 128 F.2d 376, 377 (5th Cir. 1942).
86. DeFigueiredo v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Washington v. Baugh Constr. Co., 313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
87. For a general discussion of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, see Comment,
Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 538-40
(1974).
88. 313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
89. "[T]he Equal Employment Opportunities [sic] Commission has had a full opportunity
to deal with identical issues, involving many of the parties appearing in this action, under
formal charges brought before that administrative agency by the plaintiffs in the case of
Central Contractors Association, et al. v. Local Union Number 46 .... Id. at 605.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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DeFigueiredo v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 92 presents a similar view
of the futility of requiring resort to the EEOC. In that case, a male
flight cabin attendant bypassed the EEOC and initiated a Title VII
action in federal district court, alleging employment discrimination
in favor of female attendants. Approximately two years before in-
itiation of that civil action, a female flight attendant had filed
charges with the EEOC alleging that TWA discriminated in favor
of male attendants; 93 the claim was investigated by the EEOC and a
reasonable cause finding was made, but conciliation failed. The
court in DeFigueiredo concluded that requiring the male attendant
to resort to the EEOC would require him to "participate in a
charade," especially where there was no suggestion that new in-
formation would lead the EEOC to reach a different determina-
tion.9 4
The opinions in Baugh Construction and DeFigueiredo indicate that
the EEOC charge requirement is sometimes analyzed as a question
of exhaustion of administrative remedies rather than a question of
subject matter jurisdiction.95 But it is difficult to see how the dis-
trict court proceeding falls within section 706(f)(3)'s 96 grant of
jurisdiction over civil actions against "respondent[s] named in the
charge"9 7 when no charge has been filed with the EEOC. In addi-
tion, the Baugh-DeFigueiredo approach has a serious impact on the
interests that Title VII was designed to protect.98 Nonrespondent
defendants are denied advance notice of Title VII charges and an
opportunity to participate in structured informal conciliation. The
EEOC is denied opportunities both to attempt conciliation among
all relevant parties and to exercise its option to file a civil suit in its
own name.
99
92. 322 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
93. Id. at 1386-87 & n.6.
94. Id. at 1387-88.
95. "[Tlhe appropriate administrative procedure with respect to the claim was exhausted
.. " DeFigueiredo v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1384, 1386 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Supp. II, 1972).
97. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
98. Of course, if the court concludes that the plaintiff had adequate administrative
remedies, dismissal of the district court action could destroy the plaintiff's Title VII claim in
cases in which the statutory 180 day period for filing charges with the EEOC had expired.
99. Both DeFigueiredo and Baugh were decided before enactment of the 1972 amendment
giving the EEOC the power to sue in its own name.
This effect on the EEOC's ability to file suit itself might not be serious, since the EEOC is
authorized to intervene in Title VII civil actions filed by aggrieved persons. 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-4(g)(6), 2000e-5(f)(1) (Snpp. II, 1972). Moreover, even if the complainant had been
required to resort to the EEOC before proceeding in district court, there is no guarantee
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E. Defendant Motion for Joinder
The nonrespondent defendant problem can also arise in the con-
text of a motion by a respondent defendant to join a nonrespon-
dent defendant. In Torockio v. Chamberlain Manufacturing Co. ,100 for
example, the plaintiffs filed a Title VII action against their em-
ployer and their local union, both of which had previously been
named as respondents before the EEOC. The employer moved to
join the international union, which had been a signatory to the
labor contract at issue, either as a defendant under Rule 19101 or as
a third party defendant under Rule 14.102 The court ordered join-
der under Rule 21103 on the ground that application of the general
rule against joinder of nonrespondent defendants would deprive
the defendant employer, who had not had an opportunity to join
the international before the EEOC, of its "valuable rights under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to have a resolution of all
facets of the dispute in one proceeding .... "104
If the respondent defendant attempts to join the nonrespondent
defendant under Rule 14 as a third party defendant "who is or
may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him," jurisdiction over the nonrespondent defendant can be estab-
lished on a theory of ancillary jurisdiction; it is well settled that an
independent ground of jurisdiction is not required for joining a
third party defendant. 05 But if the respondent defendant attempts
that the EEOC, given its heavy case load, would have been able to process the case and thus
be authorized to file its own action. See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1); text and notes at notes 78-79
supra.
100. 51 F.R.D. 517 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. See notes 30 & 32 supra.
102. Rule 14(a) provides:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third party
plaintiff, may cause a... complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
103. "Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or
of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just." FED. R. Civ. P.
21. The Torockio opinion contains a confusing discussion of the joinder issue. The court
apparently orderedjoinder under Rule 21 as an alternative to Rules 14 and 19. See 51 F.R.D.
at 519. Rule 21, however, merely indicates that the appropriate remedy for failure to join
parties who should have been joined tinder Rules 14 or 19 isjoinder rather than dismissal; it
is not an alternative rule for determining whether joinder is proper. See C. WRIGHT, supra
note 52, § 71, at 306.
104. 51 F.R.D. at 519.
105. "[T]he court having jurisdiction over the aggregate of facts that constitutes the
plaintiff's claim needs no additional ground of jurisdiction to determine a third party claim
that rests on the same core of facts. On this theory it is abundantly settled that there is
ancillary jurisdiction over a third-party claim . C. WRIGHT, supra note 52, § 76, at 336
(footnotes omitted).
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to join the nonrespondent defendant under Rule 19 rather than as
a third party defendant, an independent ground of jurisdiction will
be required, thus precluding use of the ancillary jurisdiction theory
to allow joinder.10 6
The effect on the interests of the nonrespondent defendant who
is joined upon motion by another defendant is identical with the
impact noted under several other jurisdictional theories--the non-
respondent defendant is denied advance notice of the charge and
an opportunity to attempt structured informal conciliation. The
respondent defendant who requested joinder obviously benefits
when his motion is granted and the nonrespondent defendant is
joined. The impact of joinder on the interests of the Title VII
plaintiff, however, is uncertain; joinder is presumably advanta-
geous to the plaintiff when he has moved to join the nonrespon-
dent defendant, but that presumption is inapplicable when joinder
is granted on the motion of a respondent defendant.
F. Joinder of Obscure Parties After Resort to the EEOC
In Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel,107 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit offered an interpretation of the
charged respondent requirement that would permitjoinder of non-
respondent defendants in a broad range of cases. The plaintiff in
Evans had filed a charge with the EEOC against her employer, her
local union, and a union joint executive board, alleging sex dis-
crimination through maintenance of sexually segregated local
unions. The district court granted without prejudice the employer's
motion to dismiss for failure to join the international union as an
indispensable party.1S Subsequently, after the district court va-
cated that order and permitted the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint naming the international union as a defendant, the in-
ternational moved for summary judgment on the ground that it
had not been named as a respondent before the EEOC.10 9 The
district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals
affirmed. 1 °
After concluding that the international union was a necessary
party under Rule 19(a), the court of appeals analyzed the statutory
106. See text following note 52 supra.
107. 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
108. See id. at 180.
109. See id. There was evidence in the record before the court of appeals that the
international union, although not formally charged before the EEOC, had actual notice of
the charge and subsequent EEOC investigation. See id. at 183 n.4.
110. Id. at 180, 184.
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framework and legislative history of Title VII to determine
whether failure to name the international before the EEOC was a
jurisdictional bar tojoinder under Rule 19.111 The court concluded
that although a Title VII complainant cannot be permitted to
bypass the EEOC completely, congressional emphasis on concilia-
tion was not intended to leave the district court powerless to order
joinder of nonrespondent defendants under Rule 19 when a
charge had been processed before the EEOC against at least one
respondent defendant. 112 This interpretation of the statute-
balancing the value of conciliation against the possibility that a
narrow view of Rule 19 joinder would obstruct complete and effec-
tive relief-is a convincing solution to the nonrespondent joinder
problem, but it fails to indicate the jurisdictional grounds for join-
der. The court never explicitly addressed the issue of the absence
of the subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against the nonre-
spondent international union, a jurisdictional defect that bars use
of Rule 19(a) to accomplish joinder. 13
In the course of affirming the district court's denial of summary
judgment, the court of appeals discussed several procedural as-
pects of the Evans action that could partially limit use of this
balancing approach. First, the court noted that the complainant
waitress in Evans could not be expected to be aware of intricate
procedural problems when filing an initial charge with the
EEOC,"1 4 thus leaving open the possibility that a different result
would be proper if there was evidence that the complainant inten-
tionally bypassed an opportunity to name a nonrespondent defen-
dant before the EEOC. This observation might also indicate that
the Evans rule should not apply in cases in which a member of the
EEOC-who should be more aware of procedural complexities-is
the initial charging party. It can be argued that such cases should
be resolved in favor of applicability of the Evans approach, since
the EEOC had investigated the charge in Evans and therefore had
an actual opportunity to charge additional parties in that case. But
it is important to note that only a member of the Commission, and
not an EEOC investigator, may file a charge.
11. Id. at 183.
112. Id. The Evans court discussed four district court opinions that it considered persua-
sive in allowing joinder: Bremer v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R. and Reyes v. Missouri-Kansas-
Texas R.R., cited at note 52 supra; Torockio Ty. Chamberlain Manufacturing Co., discussed in text
and notes at notes 100-06 supra; and Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 57
F.R.D. 102 (N.D. Miss. 1972), discussed at note 52 supra. See 503 F.2d at 182-83.
113. See text and note at note 52 supra.
114. 503 F.2d at 183.
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Second, the court noted that it was the defendant employer who
directed the district court's attention to the absence of a necessary
party. 115 Although this might be another ground for limiting the
court's approach, it would be inconsistent with the thrust of its
opinion to argue that nonrespondent joinder is permitted when a
respondent defendant raises the issue of absence of a necessary
party but not when the plaintiff raises the issue.
Like several of the other joinder theories discussed in this com-
ment, the Evans approach fails to provide the nonrespondent de-
fendant with advance notice of the charges and an opportunity to
utilize the EEOC conciliation process.
III. PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENT
These attempts by the federal courts to circumvent Title VII's
narrow grant of subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions against
originally named respondents fail to resolve satisfactorily the prob-
lem of the nonrespondent defendant. Several approaches, such as
the agency theory and the parallel civil rights theory, have only
limited applicability. Approaches like that used in Evans are un-
satisfactory because they rely on a particular balancing of the
statutory policies that may be rejected by other federal courts. And
finally, a number of these approaches interfere with the interests in
notice to respondents and opportunity to conciliate that the statute
was designed to protect. These attempts, though not completely
ineffective, point to the need for a statutory amendment to relieve
the untrained layman and the EEOC of the burden of having to
confront the complexities of subject matter jurisdiction and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at the initial stage of the adminis-
trative process.
Although there are limitations on its present operation, an
amendment of the statutory provision authorizing the district court
to stay its proceedings pending further EEOC action could provide
a workable solution to the nonrespondent defendant joinder prob-
lem. Two major difficulties with this provision under current law
are that it is discretionary on the part of the trial judge' 16 and that
expiration of the time period for filing charges with the EEOC may
preclude charging additional parties before the EEOC during the
stay period. 17 But these two difficulties are easily solved. First, the
statute can be amended to provide that the court must grant a sixty
115. Id. at 183-84.
116. See text preceding note 85 supra.
117. See text at notes 80-84 supa.
1975]
The University of Chicago Law Review
day stay whenever it concludes that a nonrespondent defendant is
a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and that ancillary jurisdiction cannot be
asserted over that party.11 8 Second, the statute can be amended to
provide that the time limit for filing a charge with the EEOC is
extended whenever a complainant who had already filed a charge
obtains a stay of the district court proceedings to charge a neces-
sary or indispensable party. There should, of course, be a statutory
limit on the length of the extension-to perhaps six months after
the complainant or the EEOC has filed a civil action in federal dis-
trict court.
One other problem with the current statutory provision authoriz-
ing a stay of district court proceedings is that the Commission may
be unable to process the case within sixty days because of its heavy
case load. 1 9 The statute should thus also be amended to allow the
district court to exercise its discretion to extend the stay for one
additional sixty day period if it concludes that the increased possi-
bility that the Commission may process and conciliate the dispute is
worth the added delay.
Together, these suggested changes solve the nonrespondent de-
fendant problem without undue interference with the interests that
Title VII was designed to protect. 20 The EEOC and aggrieved
persons are relieved of the burden of dealing with subject matter
jurisdiction issues and technical rules of joinder at the administra-
tive stage of the enforcement process.' 2 ' Respondent defendants
receive a second opportunity to negotiate a settlement during the
118. In other words, the district court would not have to grant a stay to enable a plaintiff
to file charges against parties that technically cannot be made respondents before the EEOC.
See text and notes at notes 49-52 supra.
119. See text and notes at notes 78-80 supra.
120. These suggested changes do not completely solve the problem of a defendant's
motion, for joinder. See text and notes at notes 100-06 supra. A respondent defendant can
successfully join a nonrespondent defendant as a third party defendant under Rule 14 using
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. See text and note at note 105 supra. And if the respon-
dent defendant moves to join a nonrespondent defendant under Rule 19 and the court
considers the nonrespondent defendant an indispensable party, the Title VII plaintiff will
have a strong incentive to request a stay to charge that nonrespondent before the EEOC.
The proposed amendments thus fail to resolve the nonrespondent defendant problem only
in cases in which (1) the defendant cannot successfully implead the nonrespondent defen-
dant as a third party defendant under Rule 14; (2) the court considers the nonrespondent
defendant a necessary rather than an indispensable party; and (3) the plaintiff refuses to
charge the nonrespondent before the EEOC.
121. Of course, if there is evidence that the Title VII plaintiff intentionally failed to
charge a respondent before the EEOC, a subsequent attempt by the plaintiff to join that
nonrespondent in the district court should be denied unless there are exceptional circum-
stances.
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stay, within or without the EEOC conciliation process. Nonrespon-
dent defendants receive notice of charges and an opportunity to
conciliate before being named as defendants in a Title VII civil
action. 122 And finally, the EEOC has the opportunity to conciliate
the dispute with all appropriate parties before it.
Thus, this rough spot in the Title VII enforcement framework
can easily be remedied by three minor amendments to Title VII.
This legislative solution would relieve the courts of the need to rely
on limited and unsatisfactory approaches to circumvent the general
rule against joining nonrespondent defendants.
CONCLUSION
The present statutory provision limiting federal court jurisdic-
tion in Title VII actions to civil suits against parties charged before
the EEOC is inconsistent with full and effective enforcement of
Title VII rights, and the attempts by the lower federal courts to
circumvent the jurisdictional limit are generally unsatisfactory.
With minor modifications in the existing statutory framework,
however, the procedural technicality that has at times frustrated
laymen who are unassisted by trained lawyers' 2 3 in their pursuit of
equal opportunity in employment can be eliminated.
Michael J. Sweeney
122. The only interest protected by Title VII that the proposed amendments would not
preserve is the interest of the potential respondent in being immune from Title VII charges
after 180 days following his commission of a discrete violation. Although it can be minimized
by limiting the length of the extension, his period of potential liability will be of longer
duration.
123. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972).
